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Decentralization	of	Environmental	Regulation	in	India	
Ruth	Kattumuri	and	Stefania	Lovo			
	
Abstract		Our	article	considers	the	Environment	Impact	Assessment	(EIA)	for	certain	sectors	in	India	and	examines	 the	 implications	 of	 decentralization.	 We	 find	 that	 the	 decentralization	 of	 EIA	processes	 has	 improved	 environmental	 regulation	 and	 been	 successful	 in	 reducing	 polluting	activities	 in	 India.	Our	evidence	 suggests	 that	decentralization	was	associated	with	 relatively	fewer	 firm	 births	 in	 states	 with	 stricter	 environmental	 enforcement.	 Key	 among	 our	recommendations	is	that	the	development	of	stronger	collaborations	between	EIA,	SEIAA	and	State	 Pollution	 Control	 Board	 would	 enhance	 enforcement	 of	 environmental	 regulation	 and	reduce	 disparities	 between	 states,	 through	 knowledge-and-resource	 sharing	 and	 improving	technical,	financial	and	administrative	capabilities	across	states.		
1. Introduction		Environmental	 protection	 rights	 and	 duties	 have	 long	 been	 incorporated	 in	 the	 Indian	Constitution.	Elaborate	laws	relating	to	environmental	protection	date	back	to	the	Water	Act	in	1974.	The	central	government,	through	the	Ministry	of	Environment	and	Forests	(MOEF)	and	the	 Central	 Pollution	 Control	 Board	 (CPCB),	 are	 responsible	 for	 planning	 and	 formulating	national	 policies	 and	 standards.	 The	 implementation	 and	 enforcement	 are	 decentralized	 and	are	 the	 responsibility	of	 the	State	Pollution	Control	Boards.	The	decentralization	process	has	the	 potential	 to	 reduce	 the	 burden	 on	 the	 central	 government	 and	 accelerate	 the	 approval	process.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 decentralized	 powers	 could	 be	 futile	 if	 state	 governments	intend	 to	 actively	 pursue	 industrialisation	 for	 their	 respective	 state,	 or	 be	 ineffective	 if	 state	authorities	lack	technical	and	financial	capacity.		Cistulli	 (2002)	 suggests	 that	 decentralization	 of	 environmental	 regulation	 helps	 with	 better	understanding	of	local	environmental	problems,	to	promote	more	transparent	and	efficient	use	of	 natural	 resources,	 as	 well	 as	 to	 increase	 local	 participation	 based	 on	 homogeneity	 of	common	goals	and	priorities.	At	the	same	time,	there	could	be	trade-offs	on	the	successfulness	of	 any	 decentralization	 process	 such	 as	 weak	 administrative	 or	 technical	 capacity,	 lack	 of	financial	resources,	poor	coordination	between	national	and	local	policies	and	the	risk	of	local	elite	capture	(Besley	and	Coate,	2003).		Environmental	compliance	is	sometimes	seen	as	a	barrier	to	business	creation	and	expansion.	Hence,	 it	 is	 crucial	 to	 balance	 between	 environmental	 stringency	 and	 excessive	 bureaucracy	(Upadhyay,	2017).	 Indian	citizens	also	benefit	 from	a	unique	approach	to	the	enforcement	of	environmental	 laws	 by	 exercising	 their	 constitutional	 right	 to	 a	 healthy	 environment	 in	 the	form	of	Public	Interest	Litigations	(PILs)	before	the	Court	of	Justice.	PILs	have	resulted	in	some	environmental	 improvements	 (Kathuria,	 2007)	 but	 have	 also	 contributed	 to	 increase	 the	
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workload	for	state	authorities	because	of	court-ordered	directives	(OECD,	2006).	To	overcome	challenges	 of	 bureaucracy,	 some	 states	 such	 as	 Jharkhand,	 have	 proposed	 exempting	 certain	industries	from	the	requirement	of	pollution	control	board	clearances,	which	could	potentially	have	negative	consequences	for	the	environment.	More	importantly,	several	States	are	moving	towards	comprehensive	online	systems	to	speed	up	the	clearance	process	(CII-KPMG,	2015).				In	 this	 article	we	 discuss	 the	 implications	of	 decentralization	 of	 environmental	 regulation	 in	India.	We	draw	insights	from	Lovo	(2017)	who	investigated	the	impact	of	the	2006	EIA	reform	on	the	birth	of	polluting	 firms.	 In	particular,	we	examine	whether	differences	 in	enforcement	capacity	 across	 states	 had	 produced	 heterogeneous	 effects	 on	 the	 birth	 of	 polluting	 firms.	Based	on	an	environmental	 enforcement	 index	 constructed	by	Lovo	 (2017),	we	examine	any	variations	across	states	in	India.			
2. The	EIA	reforms		
	All	firms	in	India	are	formally	required	to	receive	clearance	through	an	Environmental	Impact	Assessment	 (EIA)	 before	 they	 can	 start	 operating.	 EIA	 also	 determines	 the	 pollution	 control	measures	to	be	maintained	throughout	the	 lifetime	of	 the	 firms	operations.	A	2006	reform	of	the	EIA	process	delegated	 the	 responsibilities	 for	environmental	 clearance,	previously	under	the	 control	of	 the	 central	 government,	 to	newly	established	 state-level	 authorities	 for	 certain	sectors,	names,	State	Environmental	Impact	Assessment	Authority	(SEIAA).			The	EIA	procedure,	 as	modified	by	 the	2006	 reform,	 is	 subdivided	 into	 four	 stages.	The	 first	stage	(Screening)	is	aimed	at	determining	whether	a	project	requires	an	EIA	report.	The	second	stage	 (Scoping)	 involves	 the	 determinants	 of	 terms	 of	 references	 covering	 all	 relevant	environmental	 concerns	 for	 the	 preparation	 of	 the	 EIA.	 The	 third	 stage	 requires	 a	 public	consultation	 through	 both	 a	 public	 hearing	 in	 the	 proximity	 of	 the	 site	 and	 invitations	 of	written	 responses	 from	 the	 concerned	 stakeholders.	 The	 final	 stage	 (Appraisal)	 involves	 the	scrutiny	of	 the	EIA	application	that	can	result	in	either	approval	or	rejection	of	 the	proposed	project.	 Following	 the	2006	 reform,	 the	 second	and	 final	 stages	were	delegated	 to	state-level	authorities	if	the	project	belonged	to	specific	sectors	and	met	certain	criteria	(Lovo,	2017).				Firms	in	certain	sectors	are	no	longer	subject	to	a	decision	from	the	central	authority	but	have	to	 apply	 for	 environmental	 clearance	 to	 SEIAAs.	 Polluting	 sectors	 that	were	 not	 affected	 by	decentralization	and	maintained	a	centralized	procedures	are	offshore	and	onshore	oil	and	gas	exploration,	 development	 and	 production,	 petroleum	 refining,	 Asbestos	milling	 and	 asbestos	based	 products,	 Soda	 ash	 Industry,	 Chemical	 fertilizers,	 Petrochemical	 complexes	 and	Integrated	paint	industry.	The	automobile	industry	was	initially	included	among	the	polluting	sectors	subject	to	state-level	clearance	in	the	draft	EIA	reform,	but	was	later	removed	from	the	final	 version	 of	 the	 notification	 and	 is	 currently	 not	 subject	 to	 EIA 1 ,	 which	 seems	counterproductive	since	this	is	known	to	be	among	the	largest	sources	of	pollution.																																																										1	The	earlier	draft	notification	of	the	revised	environmental	clearance	process	that	contains	the	automobile	sector	can	be	found	on	the	Ministry	of	Environment,	Forest	and	Climate	Change	website:	http://envfor.nic.in/legis/eia/so1324(e).pdf	
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The	 EIA	 process	 was	 amended	 further	 in	 2016	 to	 address	 issues	 related	 to	 specific	 sectors	through	 a	 notification.	 Accordingly,	 the	District	 Environmental	 Impact	Assessment	Authority	(DEIAA)	 and	District	 Level	 Expert	 Appraisal	 Committee	 (DEAC)	 are	 responsible	 for	 granting	environmental	 clearance	 for	mining	 of	minor	minerals	 (S.O.	 147	 (E)	 of	 15th	 January,	 2016).		The	MOEF	had	published	a	draft	notification	(S.O.	1705(E)	of	10th	May	2016),	which	provided	an	exception	for	existing	firms	that	might	be	violating	environmental	norms.	It	suggested	that	projects,	which	had	initiated	construction	activity	and	expansion	prior	to	going	through	an	EIA	process,	could	continue	their	activities	by	agreeing	to	an	Environment	Supplemental	Plan	(ESP)	even	if	they	might	be	in	violation	of	EIA	criteria.	This	proposal	was	opposed	by	civil	societies	who	 argued	 that	 these	 proposed	 changes	 would	 allow	 firms	 to	 continue	 violating	environmental	laws.	This	representation	led	to	a	revised	notification	(S.O.	804(E)	to	be	issued	by	 the	 Environment	 Ministry	 on	 14.03.2017).	 According	 to	 the	 2017	 notification,	 the	government	has	established	a	process	by	which	an	Expert	Appraisal	Committee	at	the	Central	level	would	determine	the	conditions	for	a	firms	continued	operations.	We	note	that	while	the	2006	reform	allowed	for	public	consultation	in	the	procedure	for	evaluation	of	violating	firms,	the	new	process	does	not	specify	 this	categorically.	Public	consultations	have	enabled	 formal	representation	of	 environmental	 concerns	 from	communities,	hence	 it	would	be	beneficial	 to	make	 it	 mandatory	 for	 the	 Expert	 Appraisal	 Committee,	 within	 the	 current	 framework,	 to	undertake	public	consultation	before	finalizing	their	reports.		
3. Variations	across	states	in	environmental	enforcement	
	Environmental	 enforcement	 varies	 substantially	 across	 Indian	 states	 due	 to	 variations	 in	governance,	socio-economic	and	political	conditions	but	also	due	to	state-specific	technical	and	financial	abilities	(Nandimath,	2009).	 	While	environmental	standards	 for	 industrial	pollution	are	determined	by	the	central	government,	evidence	suggests	 that	 there	are	 large	differences	across	states	in	terms	of	enforcement	and	compliance	(OECD,	2006;	World	Bank,	2006).		
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Figure	1	–	Variation	in	Environmental	enforcement	across	States		
	Note:	 The	map	plots	 the	 environmental	 enforcement	 index	 for	 states	based	on	Lovo	(2017).			Regulatory	stringency	is	very	difficult	to	measure	because	it	is	a	multifaceted	concept	that	no	single	 indicator	 can	 fully	 capture.	 Lovo	 (2017)	 combines	 five	 different	 indicators	 of	environmental	 enforcement	 into	a	 single	 index	of	 environmental	 enforcement.	Figure	1	plots	the	 environmental	 enforcement	 index	 across	 States	 in	 India	 and	 shows	 a	 great	 degree	 of	heterogeneity	in	terms	of	regulatory	stringency.		
 The	individual	indicators	are	reported	in	Table	1	and	aimed	at	capturing	state-level	differences	in	 institutional	 capacity,	 civic	 participation	 and	 institutional	 quality	 that	 are	 relevant	 to	environmental	 enforcement.	 The	 democratic	 system	 in	 India	 offers	 the	 opportunity	 for	engagement	and	 representation	by	 civil	 societies	and	general	public,	 a	 reasonably	 free	press	and	 an	 accessible	 judiciary	 system.	 All	 these	 factors	 together	 with	 state-level	 technical	 and	institutional	 capacity	 play	 an	 important	 role	 in	 ensuring	 that	 environmental	 standards	 and	regulation	are	implemented.	The	selected	indicators	are	highly	correlated.	Descriptive	evidence	suggest	 that	state	pollution	authorities	such	as	 the	State	Pollution	Control	Boards	suffer	 from	inadequate	technical	facilities	and	skilled	personnel	for	monitoring	and	filling	charges	(OECD,	2006).							
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Table 1: Environmental enforcement measures and construction of the enforcement index 
 
Rank	 State	 Index	 NGOs	 Judgements	 Corruption	 Articles	 Stations	
1	 Delhi	 2.48	 22	 2	 11	 166	 11	
2	 Andhra	Pradesh	 2.14	 29	 4	 4	 213	 21	
3	 Tamil	Nadu	 1.80	 29	 2	 12	 443	 16	
4	 Maharashtra	 1.69	 26	 4	 5	 165	 42	
5	 Uttar	Pradesh	 0.94	 24	 4	 10	 111	 35	
6	 Gujarat	 0.81	 7	 4	 3	 146	 20	
7	 Karnataka	 0.66	 17	 3	 17	 247	 14	
8	 Odisha	 0.41	 17	 3	 9	 8	 12	
9	 Himachal	Pradesh	 0.26	 4	 2	 2	 3	 11	
10	 Kerala	 0.17	 7	 0	 1	 155	 16	
11	 West	Bengal	 0.14	 15	 2	 8	 120	 21	
12	 Madhya	Pradesh	 -0.06	 12	 4	 18	 43	 26	
13	 Punjab	 -0.95	 1	 1	 7	 25	 15	
14	 Haryana	 -1.29	 3	 1	 13	 21	 5	
15	 Chhattisgarh	 -1.31	 3	 0	 6	 4	 9	
16	 Rajasthan	 -1.33	 12	 0	 16	 6	 18	
17	 Bihar	 -1.37	 2	 3	 20	 13	 2	
18	 Assam	 -1.49	 7	 0	 15	 9	 12	
19	 Jammu	&	Kashmir	 -1.83	 6	 0	 19	 3	 3	
20	 Jharkhand	 -1.89	 2	 0	 14	 5	 6	
-	 Chandigarh	 		 2	 2	 		 4	 5	
-	 Goa	 		 0	 0	 		 13	 3	
-	 Meghalaya	 		 1	 0	 		 0	 2	
-	 Puducherry	 		 1	 0	 		 2	 3	
-	 Uttarakhand	 		 4	 1	 		 2	 2	
 Note:	The	column	header	indicates	the	name	of	the	variable.	For	the	original	sources	of	the	data	please	refer	to	Lovo	 (2017).	 The	 data	 refer	 to	 pre-reform	 (2006)	 conditions.	 The	 index	was	 computed	 using	 all	 variables	divided	by	state	population,	except	corruption,	to	account	for	differences	in	size.			Data	show	that	greater	judicial	efforts	are	found	in	states	with	lower	corruption.	They	are	also	in	line	with	effective	governance	being	more	conducive	to	building	public	awareness	about	the	environment	 as	 shown	 in	 Lal	 and	 Jha	 (1999).	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 legal	 system	 can	 take	several	years	to	settle	a	dispute	and	impose	penalties	(Breton,	2008).	The	threat	of	long	lasting	court	disputes	can	foster	rent-seeking	activities.	Duflo	et	al	(2013)	suggest	that	consultants	for	EIAs	and	the	regulator’s	own	staff	may	have	incentives	to	underreport	pollution.	They	observe	that	 independent	 verification	 of	 pollution	 reports	 through	 overlapping	 monitoring	 regimes,	may	 have	 similar	 effects,	 based	 on	 environmental	 audits.	 Further,	 in	 weaker	 enforcement	regime	collusion	between	state-level	authorities	and	regulated	firms	can	also	become	an	issue.		
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4. The	impact	on	the	birth	of	new	polluting	firms		In	 India,	 only	 registered	 formal	 sector	 firms	 are	 subject	 to	 environmental	 clearance	 since	smaller	informal	firms	tend	to	operate	outside	the	control	of	pollution	control	authorities.	The	highlighted	 differences	 in	 regulatory	 capacity	 across	 states	 is	 likely	 to	 produce	 notable	differences	 in	 compliance	 costs	 between	 locations	 and	 can,	 therefore,	 affect	 a	 firm’s	 entry	decision	and,	ultimately,	the	distribution	of	new	polluting	firms	between	states.			
Figure	2	–	Impact	of	the	reform	on	the	number	of	new	polluting	firms	
	
	
Note: Authors’ calculation based on the registrar of Companies of the Indian Ministry of Corporate 
Affairs. The plots are based on 3-year moving averages. The number of new firms is divided based on 
2006 values so that a value of 1.3, for example, indicates an increase in firm births of 30% with respect to 
2006. The shaded area indicates that SEIAA were progressively created in different states after 2006, 
mostly within 2 years from the reform. The first SEIAA was created in West Bengal in April 2007 and 
the last was instituted in December 2012 in the state of Jharkhand. 	Data	on	firms’	incorporation	into	the	Registrar	of	Companies	(RoCs)2	show	a	striking	difference	in	the	patterns	of	firm	births	between	high	and	low	enforcing	states	in	the	post-reform	period.	Figure	 2	 shows	 the	 evolution	 in	 the	 number	 of	 new	 polluting	 firms	 over	 time	 by	 level	 of	enforcement.	 	This	analysis	includes	all	sectors	for	which	the	EIA	was	decentralized	either	for	all	firms	or	for	firms	satisfying	certain	criteria.																																																									2	Available	at	Indian	Ministry	of	Corporate	Affairs:	http://www.mca.gov.in/MinistryV2/master+details.html		
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	The	 data	 show	 that	 while	 firm	 births	 in	 low	 enforcing	 states	 followed	 pre-reform	 trends,	 a	slowdown	in	births	is	observed	in	high	enforcing	states	(green	line).	This	compelling	pattern	in	the	 data	 suggests	 that	 decentralization	 was	 associated	 with	 relatively	 fewer	 firm	 births	 in	states	with	stricter	environmental	enforcement.	Regression	results	confirm	the	negative	impact	of	 state-level	 enforcement	 on	 firm	 births	 in	 states	with	 stricter	 environmental	 enforcement.	Empirical	 results	 by	 Lovo	 (2017)	 shows	 that	 the	 overall	 impact	 is	 large	 -	 close	 to	 an	 overall	12%	 reduction	 in	 the	 number	 of	 new	 polluting	 firms.	 This	 is	 because	 the	 decrease	 in	 the	number	 of	 polluting	 firms	 in	 high-enforcing	 states	 has	 been	 substantially	 larger	 versus	 the	increase	experienced	by	low	enforcing	states,	due	to	their	lower	economic	capabilities.	
	The	effect	is	consistent	with	an	increase	in	average	regulatory	stringency	driven	by	states	with	higher	levels	of	enforcement.	The	pre-reform	EIA	was	considered	to	be	relatively	 lax	 in	 India	(Jha-Thakur,	 2011)	 and	 given	 the	 anecdotal	 evidence	 on	 the	 proliferation	 of	 unchecked	polluting	firms,	the	results	show	that	the	reform	has	been	successful	in	limiting	the	creation	of	new	polluting	activities.	The	results	are	also	suggestive	of	an	actual	decrease	in	the	number	of	new	polluting	 firms	rather	than	a	switch	to	 informality	 that	would,	 instead,	 imply	no	gains	 in	terms	of	environmental	benefits	(Lovo,	2017).			
5. Discussion	and	Recommendations		India’s	 commitment	 to	 environmental	 protection	 and	 regulatory	 enforcement	 has	 grown	incrementally	 in	 the	 last	 ten	 years	 (Kini	 et.	 al.	 2017).	 Our	 findings	 indicate	 that	 the	decentralization	 process	has	 led	 to	 an	 increase	 in	 the	 average	 regulatory	 stringency	 and	 has	been	successful	in	reducing	the	number	of	polluting	activities.			The	effects	are	varied	between	states,	wherein	the	majority	of	 the	high	enforcing	states	have	accrued	environmental	benefits,	while	more	needs	to	be	done	in	other	states.	If	the	regulatory	gap	 between	 low	 and	 high	 enforcing	 states	 is	 maintained,	 the	 reform	 could,	 however,	potentially	 trigger	 an	 opportunistic	 behaviour	 by	 states	 with	 lower	 economic	 development	where	 lower	 regulatory	 enforcement	 could	 be	 aimed	 at	 attracting	 new	 polluting	 industries	(Figure	 3).	 While	 the	 economic	 gains	 could	 be	 substantial,	 the	 health	 and	 environmental	consequence	 could	 also	 be	 considerable	 (Graff	 Zivin	 and	 Neidell	 (2013).	 This	 has	 important	implications	 for	 EIA	 regulation,	 which	 should	 take	 into	 consideration	 the	 disparities	 in	environmental	enforcement	across	states	in	any	future	amendments.	The	Centre	could	also	be	involved	in	enabling	knowledge	sharing	of	best	practices	between	states,	as	well	as	in	capacity	building	 for	 resource	 constrained	 states	 to	 develop	 technical,	 financial	 and	 administrative	performance.	Without	addressing	the	technical,	financial	and	administrative	needs	of	different	States,	increased	environmental	stringency	could	translate	into	excessive	bureaucratic	burden	to	firms.	Findings	from	Enterprise	Survey	by	the	World	Bank	(2014)	suggest	that	about	12%	of	firms	already	report	tax	administration	and	business	licensing	and	permits	as	a	major	obstacles	to	business,	preceded	by	corruption	(20%)	and	inadequate	electricity	supply	(15%).					
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Figure	3	–	Environmental	enforcement	and	state-level	GDP	per	capita.	
		
		Note:	 the	 graph	 shows	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 environmental	 index	 in	 Table	 1	 and	 residual	 air	 quality,	obtained	by	computing	the	residuals	of	a	regression	of	Respirable	Suspended	Particulate	Matter(RSPM)	(source:	https://data.gov.in/)	with	GDP	per	capita.					The	ultimate	goal	 for	stricter	EIA	and	environmental	enforcement	through	rigorous	pollution	control	 is	 improving	 environmental	 quality.	 Our	 analysis	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	environmental	 enforcement	 index	 and	 environmental	 quality	 in	 Figure	 4	 clearly	 shows	 that,	states	with	stricter	enforcement	enjoy	better	air	quality	(top-right	panel).	Our	analysis	shows	that	in	spite	of	a	high	enforcing	index,	Delhi	(with	highest	GDP	per	capita	in	India)	has	low	air	quality	(it	is	ranked	among	WHO’s	20	most	polluted	cities	in	the	world).	The	reasons	for	low	air	quality	 in	 Delhi	 include	 automobile	 emissions,	 industrial	 pollution	 and	 garbage	 dumps,	inadequate	 infrastructure,	 geographic	 location	 including	 pollution	 from	 burning	 agricultural	waste	 and	 forest	 in	 nearby	 regions.	 Environmental	 decentralization	 could	 play	 a	 key	 role	 in	forming	 regulations	 tailored	 according	 to	 the	 requirements	 and	 conditions	 of	 specific	 states	and	 cities.	 Collaborations	 between	private	 and	 public	 sector	 can	 also	 play	 an	 important	 role	(Kattumuri	and	Kurian,	2017).	The	EIA	and	SEIAA	together	with	State	Pollution	Control	Board	could	do	more	to	regulate	pollution	in	Delhi	and	other	eight	Indian	cities	which	are	among	20	most	polluted	cities	in	the	world	based	on	PM2.5	levels	according	to	WHO.	
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Figure	4	–	Environmental	enforcement	and	air	pollution	by	state	
	
	Note:	The	environmental	enforcement	index	is	from	Table	1	and	residual	air	quality	was	obtained	by	computing	the	residuals	of	a	regression	of	Respirable	Suspended	Particulate	Matter	(RSPM)	(source:	https://data.gov.in/)	on	GDP	per	capita	and	population.			
	
Recommendations	1. The	 decentralization	 of	 EIA	 processes	 have	 improved	 environmental	 regulation	 and	been	 successful	 in	 reducing	 polluting	 activities	 in	 India.	 The	 evidence	 suggests	 that	decentralization	was	associated	with	relatively	fewer	firm	births	in	states	with	stricter	environmental	 enforcement.	The	EIA,	 SEIAA	and	State	Pollution	Control	Board	 should	collaborate	and	enhance	enforcement	of	environmental	regulation	to	reduce	disparities	between	 states.	 Developing	 stronger	 centre-state,	 intra-	 and	 inter-state	 collaborations	would	 be	 beneficial	 for	 knowledge-and-resource	 sharing	 and	 improving	 technical,	financial	and	administrative	capabilities	across	states.		2. A	critical	evaluation	of	all	high	polluting	firms	should	be	undertaken	in	order	to	assess	and	 accordingly	 include	 all	 relevant	 firms	 into	 the	 regulatory	 process.	 	 With	 an	increasing	upward	economically	mobile	population	and	growing	consumption	levels,	it	
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is	 essential	 to	 reassess	 the	 inclusion	 of	 all	 relevant	 industries,	 including	 automobile	industry,	for	EIA	process.	Regular	monitoring	and	reporting	should	be	mandatory.	3. Having	progressed	30	places	 for	 ‘Ease	of	Doing	Business’,	 India	 is	ranked	100th	among	190	 countries	 by	 World	 Bank’s	 Doing	 Business	 Report	 2018.	 The	 country	 should	improve	 its	 ease	 of	 doing	 business	 further	 together	 with	 enhancing	 environmental	stringency	of	companies.			4. Enhance	 responsible	 and	 effective	 governance	 and	 judicial	 processes	 to	 be	 more	conducive	to	improve	implementation	of	regulations.	5. Ensuring	public	consultations	and	representations	and	engagement	with	civil	societies	would	be	beneficial	for	enforcement	of	environmental	compliance.	6. In	any	 future	reforms	it	would	be	beneficial	 to	consider	extending	EIA	processes	to	be	applicable	 to	 SMEs,	 as	 it	 can	 contribute	 greatly	 toward	 achieving	 India’s	 goals	 for	environmental	sustainability.		
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